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Abstract
Should economics study the psychological basis of agents’ choice behaviour?
I show how this question is multifaceted and profoundly ambiguous. There is
no sharp distinction between “mentalist” answers to this question and rival
“behavioural” answers. What’s more, clarifying this point raises problems
for mentalists of the “functionalist” variety (Dietrich and List, 2016). Firstly,
functionalist hypotheses collapse into hypotheses about input–output disposi-
tions, I show, unless one places some unwelcome restrictions on what counts
as a cognitive variable. Secondly, functionalist hypotheses make some risky
commitments about the plasticity of agents’ choice dispositions.
1 Psychological Theory in Economics
Having built a model that predicts the choices that one or more agents will make
in a given setting, an economist might try to test her model, or to improve it, or to
use her model to explain the choices that these agents make. Can psychology help
economists to do this? Would it help to describe the psychological states and the
psychological processes that underlie these agents’ choices? The mentalist tradi-
tion of theorising about economics answers: very much so.1 The rival behavioural
Thank you Chloe de Canson, Caglar Dede, Conrad Heilmann, Francesco Guala and two
anonymous referees for your gracious and constructive comments on the manuscript. I’m also
indebted to Johanna Thoma and Kate Vredenburgh, and to the participants at their 2018 work-
shop at the LSE on Revealed Preferences, for discussion of some of these ideas. This work has
received funding from the EuropeanResearchCouncil under the EuropeanUnion’s Horizon 2020
Research and Innovation Programme, under grant agreement no 715530.
1For philosophical defences of this answer see Wong (1978/2006), Rosenberg (1988/2008),
Sen (1993), Rosenberg (1992), Cohen (1995), Camerer et al. (2005), Craver & Alexandrova (2008),
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tradition answers: not at all;2 modelling choices in economics is a project that is
mostly independent from the psychological study of decision-making. (It’s im-
portant to note, as I do in Clarke (2016), that one can embrace the behavioural
tradition without endorsing any discredited behaviourist or positivist theses.)
This controversy over the proper role of psychological concepts, explanations
and evidence in economics is multifaceted and profoundly indeterminate, this pa-
per will argue. In what way multifaceted? One facet of this controversy is the
issue of whether economics should study the anatomical structures in the brain
that underlie decision-making (Section 3). A second facet is the issue of whether
economics should study the causes and effects of cognitive variables (Section 4). A
third facet, I suggest, is the issue of whether economics should study the plasticity
of agents’ choice dispositions (Section 6).
In what way profoundly indeterminate? Firstly, it’s not clear what one means
by a cognitive variable. In particular, it’s not clear what restrictions one should
place on a cognitive variable counting as a genuine variable. And this indetermi-
nacy blurs the boundaries between the mentalist and behavioural traditions, I will
show (Section 5). Secondly, the notion of choice behaviour is ambiguous as well,
in a way that blurs these boundaries even further (Section 7).
This analysis has important implications for an attractive variety of mental-
ism championed by Dietrich & List (2016), namely functionalism. Functionalist
approaches to economic models face a dilemma, I suggest. On the one hand, if
functionalists place no restrictions on what counts as a genuine cognitive variable,
then functionalism collapses to an extreme form of dispositionalism, one more
agreeable to the behavioural tradition (Section 5). On the other hand, if func-
tionalists place restrictions on what counts as a genuine cognitive variable, then
functionalism commits economic models to some risky and unwelcome claims
about what’s going on in the brain (Sections 5), and to some risky claims about
the plasticity of agents’ choice dispositions (Section 6).
A corollary of my analysis is that the question of whether economics should
study the psychological basis of choice behaviour depends—amongst other things—on
the answer to five more precise questions:
(I) Does economics ultimately care about the brain anatomy that realises
agents’ functional–dispositional states? (Section 3)
Alexandrova & Haybron (2011), Lehtinen (2011), Hausman (2012), Reiss (2013), and Dietrich &
List (2016).
2See Samuelson (1948, p. 251) and Gul & Pesendorfer (2008) as extreme statements of the
ethos of the behavioural tradition. For less extreme statements, see Friedman & Savage (1952),
Binmore (2007a, p. 321), Binmore (2009, p. 14), Bernheim & Rangel (2008), Wakker (2010, p.
366), and Gilboa (2010, p. 20), as well as many textbooks, includingMas-colell et al. (1995, p. 11),
Varian (2005, p. 120), Varian (1992, pp. 131–133), Binmore (2007b, Chapters 1.4.2, 14.1–14.2).
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(II) What sort of causes and effects of cognitive variables does economics ul-
timately care about identifying, if any? (Section 4)
(III) Does one intend to impose heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a
genuine cognitive variable? (Section 5)
(IV)Does economics ultimately care about knowingwhether an agent’s choice
dispositions are plastic? (Section 6)
(V) Does economics ultimately aim to predict and explain an agent’s choices
qua intentional choices? (Section 7)
To clarify what I mean by these five questions, I will need to define the concept
of the “ultimate aims of economics” as a discipline (Section 2).
This paper builds on recent attempts within the philosophy of economics to
engage with the psychology-in-economics controversy in a nuanced way. Firstly, it
agrees with Guala (2019) that the dichotomy between the two traditions needs to
be broken down; see alsoRoss (2005). Secondly, I followClarke (2016) andThoma
(2020) in drawing attention to an ambiguity in the concept of choice behaviour.
Thirdly, I build on the work of Dietrich & List (2016) by giving an explicit example
of what a functionalist hypothesis might look like in an economic context (Section
3). This example will help fix ideas, and it will help to highlight the dilemma that,
I suggest, faces functionalist varieties of mentalism (Sections 5 and 6).
Fourthly, in framing the controversy as I just did, I am following Guala (2019)
in interpreting the primary disagreement between the mentalist and behavioural
traditions as being only secondarily about the ontology of the entities to which
economic models refer. Rather, the primary disagreement is about methodology:
how should economics explain choice behaviour, and what sort of evidence should
it use to test such explanations? Guala’s interpretation of the controversy has
the advantage that it makes the controversy of direct relevance to the practice of
economics.
2 The Ultimate Aims of Economics as a Discipline
Questions I, II, IV and V from my framework use the concept of “the ultimate
aims of economics as a discipline”. This section will explain what this concept
means.
For the reason I gave a moment ago, I follow Guala in taking the psychology-
in-economics controversy to be a controversy over what economics ought to do:
should economics study the psychological basis of choice behaviour? It follows
that any argument that speaks to this controversymust implicitly take the following
form:
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(General Argument Form)
Premise one: economics ultimately aims at U.
Premise two: activity A is a relatively good means of serving this ultimate aim
U.
Conclusion: economics ought to perform activity A.
Also: performing activity A for reason U counts as doing economics.
To fix ideas, consider the following (very simple) model of choice under uncer-
tainty.
Eve has utility 100 for outcome A: hearing an Aerosmith song. Eve also has
utility 80 for outcome B: hearing a Beyonce song. Eve expects the top card
in a deck of cards to be a diamond with 25 percent probability. Out of any
menu of options, Eve always chooses the option with the greatest expected
utility.
This economic model can be used to predict Eve’s choices over two uncertain
prospects. The first of these prospects is I : hearing Beyonce if the top card is
a diamond, hearing Aerosmith otherwise. The second is II : hearing Aerosmith
if the top card is a diamond, hearing Beyonce otherwise. Since I has greater
expected utility than II, the model predicts that Eve will never choose II when I
is on Eve’s menu of options. Indeed, this model can also be used to predict Eve’s
choices over two guaranteed outcomes. The first of these guaranteed outcomes is
A: hearing Aerosmith guaranteed. The second is B: hearing Beyonce guaranteed.
Since A has greater expected utility than I, which has greater expected utility than
II, which has greater expected utility than B, the model predicts that
Eve would never choose an option lower on the ordering A > I > II > B
when an option that comes higher on this ordering is also on Eve’s menu of
options.
This prediction is, in effect, a mapping from menus-of-options to choices: it
predicts, for each of a number of menus, the choice that Eve would make if she
were to be given that menu of options. I will call this mapping Mapping One. We
can now apply General Argument Form to this model:
(Example of General Argument Form)
Premise one: with respect to this model, economics ultimately aims just to
know whether Mapping One is true.
Premise two: studying the psychological basis of Eve’s choice behaviour is a
relatively good means of serving this ultimate aim.
Conclusion: economics ought to study the psychological basis of Eve’s choice
behaviour.
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Also: studying the psychological basis of Eve’s choice behaviour (in order to
work out whether Mapping One is true) counts as doing economics.
Although some theorists will be sympathetic towards this argument (Clarke,
2014), others will reject it. For example, one might reject this argument by deny-
ing (1): perhaps economics aims to do more with this model than to raise the
question of whether Mapping One is true. Or one might reject this argument by
denying (2): a much better way of working out whether Mapping One is true is
just to observe Eve’s choices, one might contend, not to study the psychological
basis of Eve’s choice behaviour. Irrespective of what one thinks of this argument,
however, this argument illustrates how the position one takes in the psychology-
in-economics controversy is determined, in part, by what one takes the ultimate
aims of economics to be. (By the by, this argument also alerts one to the possi-
bility that psychological evidence can be used to test hypotheses—like Mapping
One—that don’t themselves have much psychological content.)3
Of course, my use of the concept of the “ultimate aims of economics” raises
the question of how to define this concept. But I’m afraid that I cannot offer a
set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on something being
an ultimate aim of economics. Instead, I define the concept of the ultimate aims
of economics by the role that it ought to play in our reasoning about (i) what
economics as a discipline ought to do, and (ii) what counts as doing economics. In
particular, the concept of the ultimate aims of economics is defined by the fact that
General Argument Form is a valid argument. (This is just as one cannot offer an
informative set of necessary and sufficient conditions, many philosophers think,
for the concept “is a cause of ” or the concept “has a physical probability of fifty
percent of occurring”. But one can nevertheless describe how one ought to reason
with such concepts, thus implicitly defining them by the role that they ought to
play in our reasoning.)
So, when I talk of the ultimate aims of economics, I am talking normatively
and constitutively. Consider an analogy: normatively speaking, the ultimate aim
of a university is to produce knowledge and to foster autonomy, one might claim.
This remains the case even if, in actual fact, universities sometimes fail to live
up to this aim. However, if an institution systematically falls very far short of
meeting this aim, then one would not count the institution as a university. Instead
it constitutes a diploma mill, one might say. Analogously, to talk of the ultimate
aims of economics is to say something normative about what economics ought to
do, and something constitutive about what counts as doing economics.
What’s more, just as the beliefs and desires of an institution can differ from the
beliefs and desires of the members of an institution (List & Pettit, 2011), so too can
3Although see Section 7 for a respect in which even Mapping One might have some psycho-
logical content. And see Clarke (2014) for extensive discussion.
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institutional aims, I claim. For example, the ultimate aim of a game of football,
one might claim, is that the interaction between the players is fun, and perhaps
even beautiful. And this is true even if all the individual players care only about
victory over the opposing team. (Indeed, in such a case it’s still possible for the
resulting interaction between the players to be fun and beautiful.) Analogously,
the ultimate aims of economics—that is, of economics as an institution—need not
be the same as the desires of economists as individuals.
Nevertheless, there must be some connection between the ultimate (normative
and constitutive) aims of economics as an institution and the desires of individual
economists, I’d suggest, albeit a loose one. To see this, consider the difference
between the aims of economics and the aims of chemistry, say. What reason do
we have for thinking that it is not an ultimate aim of economics to understand
how chemicals bond with each other? It must be something to do with the insti-
tutional histories of chemistry and of economics: although some economists want
to understand chemical bonding, almost none would want to use the institutional
resources of an economics department to study chemical bonding, nor to publish
scientific papers on bonding in an economics journal. Therefore, what individual
economists do when they “have their economics hats on” provides some evidence
about the aims of economics as a discipline.
For example, this point is used by Hausman (2000, 2012) in his argument
against the behavioural tradition. Hausman argues that it is very difficult to make
sense of how game theorists reason game theoretically, without attributing to them
the aim of describing an agent’s psychology. Thus Hausman uses what individ-
ual economists do, with their economics hats on, in order to draw an inference
about what economics as a discipline aims to do. (The general idea is an intu-
itive one (Davidson, 1973/1984). One looks at a past practice, one hypothesises
about the aim that the actors might be pursuing in this practice, and then one
selects the hypothetical aim that offers the most charitable way of rationalizing
that practice—the aim in light of which the practice appears most reasonable.)
In sum, questions I, II, IV and V from my framework are about the ultimate
aims of economics. But I’ve argued that any argument about what economics
ought to do—about what psychological concepts, explanations and evidence eco-
nomics ought to be employing—must be based on some assumptions about the
ultimate aims of economics. It follows that how one answers these four questions
is of great important to how economics ought to be practised. I will illustrate this
abstract point more concretely as I examine each question in turn.
One common way of avoiding questions such as these is to say that economics
ultimately cares about understanding agents’ choice behaviour, and to leave it at
that. But to say this is to say very little indeed. Take, for comparison, a scien-
tist who tells you that her discipline aims to understand why Jair Bolsonaro has
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COVID-19. This scientist might be an immunologist, a discipline which aims to
understands how the SARS-CoV-2 virus disrupts the functioning of the lungs as
a system. Or this scientist might be a microbiologist, a discipline which focuses
on the cellular level, aiming to unpack the mechanism whereby the SARS-CoV-2
virus attacks cells in the human body. Or this scientist might be an epidemiolo-
gist, a discipline which aims to trace the transmission of the virus from person to
person. Or the scientist might be a sociologist, a discipline which aims to explain
how Bolsonaro’s politics made a difference to his willingness to take precautions
against contracting the virus. In other words, there is a vast network of causes of
Bolsonaro getting COVID-19. No discipline aims to identify all these causes. In
general, when studying an outcome of interest, each discipline narrows its atten-
tion to a particular type of cause—its ultimate aim only being to discover which
causes of that narrow type caused the outcome in question. Applying this general
lesson to the case of economics and psychology: to take a position on the role of
psychological concepts, explanations and data in economics, one needs to com-
mit oneself to a position on the domain of economics. What subset of the causes
of choice behaviour are the causes that economics ultimately cares about? And
questions I, II, IV, V provide a framework of possible answers to this question.
3 Does Economics Care about the Hardware that Realises Disposi-
tions?
One way of interpreting the question “should economics study the psychological
basis of agents’ choice behaviour?”, I will now suggest, is to interpret it as the
question “should economics study the brain anatomy or hardware that realises
an agent’s functional–dispositional states?”. It follows, as a corollary, that a help-
ful precursor to answering the above question is to first ask question I from my
proposed framework: does economics ultimately care about this brain anatomy or
hardware? To spell out what all this means, this section will quickly rehearse some
of the key ideas from the literature on functionalism in the philosophy of mind
(Block, 1980; Fodor, 1987; Lewis, 1980/1983, 19941999; Shoemaker, 1981/1984).
The first thing I need to do is introduce the concept of a hardware variable.
The following are all examples of what I will call hardware variables: the degree to
which blood is flowing into the amygdala; whether or not a given neuron is firing;
the type of electrical activity in the hippocampus. What makes these variables
count as hardware variables is that they are defined in terms of entities (blood)
interacting with other entities (the amygdala)—where these entities are themselves
defined by the physical substance out of which they are made (blood contains
red blood cells and white blood cells) their structure (these cells are suspended in
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plasma) and by their physical position in relation to other entities (the amygdala).
Note also that my examples of hardware variables are all relatively local: their
values are intrinsic properties of a sub-region of the brain, not of the brain as a
whole. But I do not stipulate that all hardware variables must be local. Note
also that my examples of hardware variables were all examples of the anatomy of
an individual human. But I do not stipulate that all hardware variables must be
variables relating to human anatomy. Instead, they can be variables relating to
the silicone transistors in a computer, for example.
Next I will need to introduce the concept of a hardware variable playing a
causal role. To illustrate, recall the model from Section 2, and let’s imagine that
there are three hardware variables fUa Ub and Pg for which the following coun-
terfactual conditionals are true.
If variable Ua were to take any given value ua, and variable Ub were to take
any given value ub, and variable P were to take any given value 0 < p < 1,
and if Eve’s menu were any given subset of the four options I II A B, then Eve
would choose the option with the greatest expected utility as defined by ua
ub and p.
(Means–Ends Agency Causal Role)
Of any three hardware variables, I will say that these variables play themeans–ends
agency causal role if and only if the counterfactual conditionals above are true of
these three variables. Thus I am assuming that counterfactual conditionals, when
suitably interpreted, describe causal relationships between variables (Woodward,
2003).
Similarly, for any five hardware variables fUa; P; E; S; and Dg to play the
“emotional effects causal role” they must satisfy the following counterfactual con-
ditionals:
(Emotional Effects Causal Role)
(i) If Ua were high, then Eve would be excited (E = 1) if she were to hear
Aerosmith. And if Eve were excited (E = 1), then the corners of her mouth
would turn into a smile, and her heart-rate would increase.
(ii) If P were high, then Eve would be surprised (S = 1), if the first card in the
deck were revealed not to be a Diamond. And if Eve were surprised (S = 1),
her eyebrows would raise.
(iii) If Ua were high, and P were high, and Eve had chosen option II, Eve
would be disappointed (D = 1), if she were not to hear Aerosmith. And if
Eve were disappointed (D = 1), the corners of her mouth would droop, and
her heart-rate would decrease.
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Similarly, for any three hardware variables fP;BS and TBg to play the “in-
formation driven causal role” they must satisfy the following counterfactual con-
ditionals:
(Information Driven Causal Role)
(i) If Eve were shown that this deck of cards has a track record of delivering
a diamond n times out of m, when shuffled, and if Eve were to believe that
the deck of cards has been shuffled (BS = 1), then P would be roughly n/m,
assuming suitably high m.
(ii) If Eve were to trust Nina’s testimony (TN = 1), and if Nina were to tell
Eve that there are n diamonds in this deck of m cards, then P would be be
roughly n/m.
Similarly, for any two hardware variables fUa; Ubg to play the “new tastes”
causal role they must satisfy the following counterfactual conditionals:
(New Tastes Causal Role)
(i) If Eve had socialised in the past with people who like Aerosmith, then
Ua would be higher. If Eve had socialised in the past with people who like
Beyonce, then Ub would be higher.
(ii) If Aerosmith were to become more scarce a commodity, then Ua would
eventually become lower. If Beyonce were to become more scarce a com-
modity, then Ub would eventually become lower. (See Elster (1985) on sour
grapes.)
With all this inmind, one hypothesis that a behavioural scientist may ultimately
aim to test is the following hypothesis:
(HypothesisHF ) Eve is in functional–dispositional state FD, namely the state
of being such that:
(i) there is at least one set of eight hardware variables fUa, Ub, P , E, D, S,
TN and BSg for Eve that plays these four causal roles (means–end agency,
emotional effects, information driven and new tastes);
(ii) variable Ua = 100, Ub = 80, and P = :25.
Note that hypothesisHF says nothing further about the physical entities whose
properties these eight hardware variables denote. The location (in the brain or
otherwise) of these entities remains entirely unspecified, as does the physical sub-
stance and physical structure out of which they are built. All that hypothesis
HF says is that there are eight unspecified hardware variables that play the four
causal roles above. Yes, this hypothesis labels these eight variables as “utility for
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Aerosmith”, “utility for Beyonce”, “probability of diamond”, “excited”, “disap-
pointed”, “surprised”, “trusts Nina” and “believes the deck to be shuffled”. But
I included these labels purely to illustrate the above causal roles in an intuitive
way. These labels can be deleted. They are not intended to add anything over
and above the claim that there are eight unspecified hardware variables that play
the four causal roles above. For example, “utility for Aerosmith” is just defined in
terms of these four causal roles: to say of some variable Ua that it denotes Eve’s
utility for Aerosmith, for example, is just to say that Ua plays these four causal
roles.
In virtue of this, I will say that hypothesis HF is a “functionalist hypothesis”,
and I will say that HF treats these eight hardware variables as “cognitive vari-
ables”, because this hypothesis picks them out merely by describing some of the
causal relationships into which they enter. Also in virtue of this, I will call state
FD itself a “functional–dispositional state”. So “cognitive variable” is just a label
I will use for a hardware variable, when that variable is picked out causally, with
the hardware features of that variable remaining unspecified. This is all that I will
mean by a cognitive variable in this paper. Cognitive / hardware variables Ua Ub
and P are said to “realise” this functional–dispositional state FD.
It’s worth pointing out that most philosophers would qualify functionalist hy-
pothesisHF . They would only require that these eight hardware variables tend to
satisfy the counterfactuals given in these four causal roles. For example, surprise
doesn’t always cause raised eyebrows. I will put this complication aside in this
paper.
Corollary. I can now illustrate the value of the first question in my proposed
framework. Imagine that you know hypothesisHF to be true, but you don’t know
the anatomy of these eight hardware variables—the location, substance, structure
of whatever entities they relate to. Suppose that you then discover that variable Ua
is a feature of the hippocampus. Does economics care about this discovery as an
end in itself ? Does this discovery about Eve speak to one of the questions about
Eve that economics is ultimately aiming to answer? Camerer (2008) andGlimcher
et al. (2005) would probably answer yes. Glimcher, for example, is interested as an
end in itself in whether utilities are encoded in highly-localised bunches of neurons.
Dietrich & List (2016) would answer no: they suggest that the only psychological
hypotheses that economics ultimately cares about are functionalist hypotheses;
and functionalist hypotheses abstract away from the details of the hardware, as
I’ve just illustrated. Functionalist hypotheses treat hardware variables as cognitive
variables. Economists in the behavioural tradition would clearly answer no, as
would Clarke (2016), Guala (2019), Thoma (2020) and Vredenburgh (2020). For
many other theorists, however, it’s not clear how they would answer this question
about the ultimate aims of economics.
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Why is the answer to this question important? If the answer to question I is
yes, then economics has a straightforward reason to care about evidence from
the brain-scanner. EEG, fMRI and other brain scanning methods are, after all,
methods designed to measure the activities of anatomical entities in the brain. If
instead the answer to question I is no, then economics’ reasons (if any) for car-
ing about evidence from the brain scanner will be less straightforward than if the
answer is yes. You might perhaps conjecture that testing a hypothesis h1 about
anatomical structures is a good means to testing some other hypothesis h2 that
economics ultimately cares about (Clarke, 2014). An example of h2 might be an
hypothesis about how Eve will respond to various incentives. So this conjecture
linking h1 with h2, if true, gives economics a reason to care about evidence from
the brain scanner. But in this case you will need to marshal an argument to sup-
port your conjecture linking h1 with h2, an argument that others may not find
compelling. In contrast, if the answer is yes, then your reasons for using brain-
scanner evidence are more obvious and less conjectural: economics cares about
h1 directly.
In sum, one way of interpreting the question “should economics study the
psychological basis of agents’ choice behaviour?”, I’ve suggested, is to interpret
it as the question “should economics study the brain anatomy or hardware that
realises an agent’s functional–dispositional states?”. And it followed, as a corollary,
that a helpful precursor to answering this question is to first ask question I frommy
proposed framework: does economics ultimately care about this brain anatomy
or hardware?
4 Which Cognitive Relationships Does Economics Care About Identi-
fying?
An alternative way of interpreting the question “should economics study the psy-
chological basis of agents’ choice behaviour?”, I will now suggest, is to interpret it
as the question “should economics study the causes and effects of cognitive vari-
ables?”. It follows, as a corollary, that a helpful precursor to answering this ques-
tion is to first ask question II from my proposed framework: which causes and
effects of cognitive variables does economics ultimately care about identifying, if
any?
Take the model of Eve from Section 2, for example. Of these three cognitive
variables Ua Ub and P , one can ask: which external causes (information, social-
isation) of these three variables does economics ultimately care about identify-
ing, if any? which cognitive causes (Eve’s belief that the deck has been shuffled,
Eve’s trust in Nina’s testimony) of these three variables does economics ultimately
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care about identifying, if any? and which cognitive effects (excitement, disap-
pointment, surprise) of these three variables does economics ultimately care about
identifying, if any?
One answer, for example, is that economics ultimately only cares about the
external causes (information, socialization) of these three variables, but not about
their cognitive causes themselves, nor about their cognitive effects. I will call this
position the weakly conservative position. In this case, the weakly conservative
position says that economics is ultimately interested in the new tastes role, but
that it is not ultimately interested in the emotional effects role. And it says that
economics is only partially interested in the information driven role; in particular,
economics is not ultimately interested what the information driven role says about
the cognitive variables that mediate the causal relationship between information
(on the one hand) and P (on the other hand). According to the weakly conser-
vative position, economics ultimately aims to know (i) how information makes a
difference to Eve’s probabilities, (ii) how factors like socialisation make a differ-
ence to her utilities, and (iii) how her probabilities and utilities and opportunities
make a difference to her choices.
So, on the weakly conservative position, as far as the causal relationship be-
tween external factors and choices is concerned, economics ultimately aims to
know (iv) how information, socialisation and opportunities determine Eve’s choices.
That is to say, to describe Eve’s choices across a broad range of external circum-
stances—in particular a broad range of informational scenarios and a broad range
of socialisation scenarios. Indeed, the functionalist hypothesis that corresponds to
the weakly conservative view FWC entails that, if Eve had instead been socialised
with people who listen to Beyonce, then Eve would never choose an option lower
on the ordering B > II > I > Awhen an option that comes higher on this ordering
is also on Eve’s menu of options. This is because Ub would instead to be greater
than Ua. I will call this mapping from menus-of-options to choices Mapping Two.
Similarly, FWC entails that, if Eve had instead information that 70 cards in 100
cards were diamonds, for example, then Eve would never choose an option lower
on the ordering A> II > I > B when an option that comes higher on this ordering
is also on Eve’s menu of options. This because P would instead be greater than
0.50. I will call this Mapping Three. (To be clear, FWC “corresponds” to the weak
conservative position in the sense that FWC interprets the model from Section 2
as describing only those details of Eve that the weak conservative positions says
economics is ultimately interested in.)
A more strongly conservative position is that, ultimately, economics only cares
about identifying the causal relationship between Ua Ub P and choice behaviour.
That is to say, economics ultimately cares about the means–ends agency causal
role only, rather than about any of these other causal relationships. In contrast
12
to weak conservatism, strong conservatism entails that, as far as the causal re-
lationship between external factors and Eve’s choices are concerned, economics
ultimately aims merely to describe Eve’s choices in the actual informational po-
sition that she faces, and the actual socialisation scenario that she faces. It aims
merely to describe her choices across variation in the opportunities that are of-
fered to her. (That is to say, across variation in her incentives, or equivalently,
the menus of options available to her.) Indeed, the functionalist hypothesis that
corresponds to the strong conservative positionHSC entails precisely the following
about Eve’s choices: Eve would never choose an option lower on the ordering A
> I > II > B when an option that comes higher on this ordering is also on Eve’s
menu of options. This is Mapping One.
Imagine for example that you believe the functionalist hypothesis HF to be
true. But suppose that you then come to learn that no eight hardware variables
play all four causal roles in Eve. Nevertheless, you were right that three hardware
variables play the means–end agency causal role. And you were right that for
these three variables Ua = 100, Ub = 80, and P = :25. It follows, for example,
that Eve responds to incentives exactly as you expected, that is, to expansions and
contractions in the opportunities (menu of options) available to her. But Eve’s
emotions do not respond as you imagined. And indeed her probabilities and util-
ities do not change over time as you expected in response to information or to
socialisation. Strong conservatism entails that economics does not care about any
or all of these discoveries as an end in itself. None of these discoveries about Eve
speak to one of the questions about Eve that economics is ultimately aiming to
answer.
It is clear that many economists take a conservative position about the aims of
economics.4 But it is not clear how strongly conservative: it seems that economics
is ultimately interested in information as an external cause of choice; but does
economics ultimately care about socialisation as an external cause?
In fact, things are further complicated by the existence of an even more ex-
treme conservative position: ultimately economics does not care about any cog-
nitive variables at all, including Ua Ub P . So economics does not ultimately care
about functionalist hypotheses such as HF or HWC or HSC . Instead economics
ultimately cares only about how external factors influence choice behaviour, for
example, about hypotheses such as Mapping One.
A fourth position is what I will call the radical position. The radical position is
inspired by philosophical decision theorists—in particular by Lewis (1994/1999),
Zynda (2000), Christensen (2004), Eriksson & Hayek (2007), and Meacham &
4For agreement with this emphasis on external factors as causes of choice, see Friedman &
Savage (1948), Bernheim (2008, p. 3), Binmore (2009), Dekel & Lipman (2010, p. 273), and
Vromen (2011, sec. 6).
13
Weisberg (2011), who argue as follows.
(1) Probabilities and utilities in philosophical decision theory are quantitative
analogues of the beliefs and desires from commonsense psychology.
(2) But beliefs and desires from commonsense psychology are defined func-
tionally by a very broad range of causal roles—much wider than the four
roles I described in Section 3—and absolutely not by the means–end agency
role alone.
So (3) probabilities and utilities in philosophical decision theory are defined
by a very broad range of causal roles.
It follows from this argument that, insofar as economics ultimately cares about
an agent’s probabilities and utilities as understood by philosophical decision the-
ory, economics cares implicitly about identifying a very broad range of causal
roles. To talk about probabilities and utilities just is to talk implicitly about this
broad range of causal roles, according to functionalism. Accordingly, if you think
that economics ultimately cares about this very broad range of causal roles, then
I will call you a radical about the aims of economics.
In passing, I want to give a reason to adopt a less-than-radical position. Namely:
the causal roles to which the radical position points are ill-defined. The radical
position says: whatever causal roles define the beliefs and desires of common-
sense psychology, economics ultimately cares about the quantitative analogues of
those causal roles for utilities and probabilities. There are two problems with this
claim. The first problem is that the causal roles that define beliefs and desires are
ill-defined. For example, for any given theory about the causal roles that define
the variable “believing that the MMR vaccine causes autism”, there are many
alternative theories that are also plausible. One theory will say that a hardware
variable does not count as “believing that the MMR vaccine causes autism” un-
less that variable is sensitive to testimony frommedical experts; but another theory
will deny this causal role is definitive of this belief. So the causal roles that define
the beliefs and desires of commonsense psychology are very much contested and
unclear.5 The second problem is that for any proposed constraint on beliefs and
desires, it is not clear what the quantitative analogue of that constraint is. Take for
example the constraint that people choose the action that according to their beliefs
will satisfy their desires. Is the quantitative analogue of this the principle of utility
maximisation? Or is it instead something logically weaker such as the principle
5See any of the discussions within meta-ethics on moral motivation (Smith, 1994) or within
the philosophy of action on reasons for action (Velleman, 2000). The discussion on “eliminative
materialism” in the philosophy of mind can also be read as a debate about to what extent any neu-
ral variables actually do play the causal roles that define commonsense psychology (Churchland,
1981; Horgan & Woodward, 1985; Jackson & Pettit, 1990).
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of stochastic dominance? It’s unclear. So one point in favour of adopting a less-
than-radical position is that doing so forces you to be clear about the causal roles
that you think economics ultimately cares about identifying. (However, there are
many positions that are less-than-radical without being conservative, for example,
positions that allow economics to take an ultimate interest in the emotional effects
role.)
Corollary. I can now illustrate the value of the second question in my proposed
framework. Suppose that economics ultimately cares about identifying the emo-
tional effects relationship. In this case, economics then has a straightforward rea-
son to care about Eve’s self report of her own phenomenology. If Eve tells you
that she didn’t feel very disappointed, after she expected to hear Aerosmith, but
didn’t, then this is evidence against an hypothesis h1 about Eve’s emotional effects,
an hypothesis that economics ultimately aims to assess. In contrast, if economics
doesn’t care about emotional effects in themselves, then economics’ reasons, if
any, for caring about self-report phenomenological evidence will be less straight-
forward. Perhaps you might conjecture that the following is true: the fact that Eve
reports that she is not disappointed here is evidence that h2 Eve would not choose
Aerosmith in a choice between Aerosmith and Beyonce. And suppose that this hy-
pothesis h2 is indeed something economics does ultimately care to assess. In which
case, economics does have a reason to care about self-report phenomenological
evidence. However, this conjecture—that this self-report data is indeed evidence
against this hypothesis h2—is a risky conjecture, one that others may not find com-
pelling. In contrast, if economics does ultimately care about emotional effects in
themselves, then its reasons for using self-report phenomenological evidence are
obvious and much less risky.
I conclude that second way of interpreting the question “should economics
study the psychological basis of agents’ choice behaviour?” is to interpret it as
the question “should economics study the cognitive causes and cognitive effects of
cognitive variables?”. It follows, as a corollary, that a helpful precursor to answer-
ing this question is to first ask question II from my proposed framework: which
cognitive causes and cognitive effects of cognitive variables does economics ulti-
mately care about identifying, if any?
5 Does One Intend to Impose Heavy-Duty Restrictions on Genuine
Variables?
Some sets of states constitute a genuine variable and some don’t. For example
the set of states fis solid, is a liquid, is a gasg constitutes the values of a genuine
variable; as perhaps does the set of states fis red, is blueg. But the set of states fis
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a red solid or a blue liquid, is a blue solid or a red liquidg does not constitute the
values of a genuine variable, many would say. In this section, I will argue that it’s
not clear what cognitive variables count as genuine variables. As a result, func-
tionalist hypotheses about cognitive processes are in danger, I argue, of collapsing
to hypotheses about input–output dispositions, hypotheses more agreeable to the
behavioural tradition. That is to say, unless one places heavy-duty restrictions on
what counts as a genuine cognitive variable. This creates a dilemma for func-
tionalists, I suggest. And it motivates the third question in my framework: (III)
does one intend to impose heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine
hardware / cognitive variable?
To motivate this question, consider a functionalist hypothesis that describes
how Eve’s choices depend upon various external factors; for example, upon the
way Eve was socialised and upon the opportunities Eve is given, that is, her menu
of options. What’s more, this functionalist hypothesis describes how this causal
relationship is mediated by Eve’s probabilities and utilities. And that’s all that
it describes. I will call such functionalist hypotheses “two-step” functionalist hy-
potheses, because such hypotheses describe a first step from external factors to
utilities and probabilities, and then a second step from utilities and probabilities
to choices. (Note that functionalist hypotheses that appeal to the emotional effect
role or the information driven role do not count as two-step hypotheses, because
these causal roles each issue in a third step, as it were.)
Putting this point somewhat more technically, a two-step functionalist hypoth-
esis is a long conjunction of propositions—a conjunction in which the ith propo-
sition takes the following form:6
(Proposition i)
(i) If Eve were to face conjunction Ei of external factors, then genuine cog-
nitive variable Ua would take value ai, genuine cognitive variable Ub would
take value bi, and genuine cognitive variable P would take value pi;
(ii) If Ua were to take value ai, Ub were to take value bi, and P were to take
value pi, then (regardless of the external factors E) Eve would choose Ci.
To create proposition 1, for example, think about one possible way in which
Eve might have been socialised, and one possible set of opportunities open to her.
Call this conjunction of opportunities and socialisation E1. Then fill in the choice
C1 that Eve is predicted to make in scenario E1, as well as the value a1 b1 and p1
that Ua Ub and P are predicted to have respectively in E1. To create proposition
2, think about another possible conjunction of opportunities and socialisation E2
and do the same; and so on for proposition 3 and the like.
6More accurately, they are this long list prefaced with “There exist variables Ua and Ub and P
such that : : :”.
16
I will now argue that two-step functionalist hypotheses are disguised hypothe-
ses about (a) “input–output” dispositions and also about (b) what particular hard-
ware / cognitive variables count as genuine variables. To kick-start the argument,
note that proposition i clearly entails:
(Proposition i) There is some hardware state of Eve’s Hi, such that:
(i) Necessarily hardware state Hi occurs if and only if genuine cognitive vari-
able Ua takes value ai and genuine cognitive variable Ub takes value bi and
genuine cognitive variable P takes value pi;
(ii) If Eve were to face conjunction Ei of external factors, then she would be
in hardware state Hi;
(iii) If Eve were in hardware state Hi, then (regardless of the external factors
E) she would choose Ci.
But let E[Ua = ai] denote the set of those (conjunctions of) external factors
that each cause Ua = ai, according to the functionalist hypothesis in question. For
example, if the functionalist hypothesis says that E1 causes Ua = ai, then E1 will
be included in set E[Ua = ai]. What’s more, let H[Ua = ai] denote the set of
hardware states that are each caused—as a matter of fact—by at least one of the
(conjunctions of) external factors in E[Ua = ai]. For example, if the functionalist
hypothesis says thatE1 causes Ua = ai, and if as a matter of factE1 causesH1, then
H1 will be included in set H[Ua = ai]. Note that it follows from these definitions
that, if the functionalist hypothesis in question is true, genuine cognitive variable
Ua takes the value ai if and only if one of the hardware states in set H[Ua = ai]
occurs. The point of defining things in this way is that the claim that “a state in
H[Ua = ai] occurs” can operate as a sort of stand-in for the claim that Ua = ai.
In fact, the only difference between these two claims is that the former is not
committed to the further claim that H[Ua] denotes a genuine cognitive variable.7
By the same process defineH[Ub = bi] andH[P = pi]. Given these definitions,
proposition i clearly entails:
(Proposition i) There is some hardware state of Eve’s Hi, such that:
(i) State Hi is a member of H[Ua = ai] and H[Ub = bi] and H[P = pi];
(ii) If Eve were to face conjunction Ei of external factors, then she would be
in hardware state Hi;
(iii) If Eve were in hardware state Hi, then (regardless of the external factors
E) she would choose Ci.
Which clearly entails:
7That is to say, the further claim that fA state in H[Ua = a1] occurs, A state in H[Ua = a2]
occurs, A state in H[Ua = a3] occurs, : : : g constitutes the values of a genuine cognitive variable.
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(Proposition i) There is some hardware state of Eve’s Hi, such that:
(i) If Eve were to face conjunction Ei of external factors, then she would be
in hardware state Hi;
(ii) if Eve were in hardware state Hi, then (regardless of the external factors
E) she would choose Ci.
And this clearly entails proposition i: if Eve were to face conjunction Ei of
external factors, then she would choose Ci.
More importantly, the reverse entailments hold too. Proposition i entails
proposition i, because external factors cannot cause choices except via hardware
states. But proposition i entails proposition i, one can show.8 And proposition
i entails proposition i, given one substantial assumption: H[Ua] constitutes a
genuine cognitive variable, as does H[Ub] and H[P ]. And proposition i clearly
entails proposition i. It follows that—given this substantial assumption about
these three hardware / cognitive variables being genuine variables—proposition
i is equivalent to proposition i. But functionalist hypotheses are collections of
propositions of type . And collections of propositions of type  are just hypotheses
about input–output dispositions.9 So any given two-step functionalist hypothesis
is equivalent to (a) an hypothesis about an agent’s input–output dispositions, plus
(b) an hypothesis that says of some particular hardware / cognitive variables that
they are genuine.
However, in effect, this logic shows that a two-step proposition (proposition i)
is equivalent to a one-step proposition (proposition i). And so by repeated appli-
cation of this logic, a twenty-step proposition, say, might be shown to be equiva-
lent to a one-step proposition—at least in some cases.10 So the conclusion I’ve just
drawn applies more generally to other functionalist hypotheses that contain multi-
ple steps. So these functionalist hypotheses have psychological content—over and
above the psychological content of an input–output disposition—in the respect
that functionalist hypotheses make particular claims about which sets of hardware
states constitute the values of genuine cognitive variable. So, if it turns out that
it is very easy for a hardware / cognitive variable to be a genuine variable, then
such functionalist hypotheses have little additional psychological content. But, if
8Proposition i says that Ei caused Hi. But the functionalist hypothesis says that Ei causes
Ua = ai and Ub = bi and P = pi. And so, our definition of H[Ua = ai] and of H[Ub = bi] and of
H[P = pi] tells us that Hi is a member of all three sets.
9To be contrasted, for example, with Guala’s talk of “belief-dependent” dispositions.
10This is just a brief outline of an argument. I suspect there will be a number of important
qualifications to the scope of this argument. Firstly, note that the functionalist hypotheses I am
dealing with say nothing about the relative timing of changes in values of the cognitive hardware
variables. Secondly, I suspect that cognitive / hardware variables that make a repeat appearance
in a functionalist hypothesis (e.g at step two and then again at step ten) will pose difficulties for this
argument.
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instead there are heavy-duty constraints on what counts as a genuine variable,
then such functionalist hypotheses have lots of additional psychological content.
This raises the third question in my framework: what is required in order for a set
of hardware states to constitute the values of a genuine cognitive variable?
One necessary condition that I personally find attractive in this setting is the
following: if a variable genuinely exists, Ua for example, then it is possible for
that variable to take on different values from its actual value. For example, it is
not possible, in any substantial sense, to intervene on Eve to make Eve a Porsche
or a hanging basket or a horse. And, in virtue of this one might think, there is
no “is a Porsche” variable or a “is a hanging basket variable” or a “is a horse”
variable that applies to Eve. Here I am talking about interventions in principle
not interventions in practice, mind. This condition does not entail that there is a
practically feasible intervention on Eve that would set the Ua variable to a different
value. (To claim otherwise would be to place too demanding a constraint on the
existence of a variable.)
A second plausible necessary condition is that the hardware states associated
with a genuine variable all must be hardware states local to the same area of the
brain; thus the only genuine cognitive variables are local. If this necessary condi-
tion is correct, it commits functionalist hypotheses such as HF HWC and HSC to
the following risky conjecture: utilities and probabilities are encoded in local re-
gions of the brain; they are not features of the brain as a whole. The alternative is
that utilities and probabilities are encoded by a huge complex of neural pathways
that go all over the frontal lobe, the parietal lobe, the occipital lobe, the temporal
lobe, and the limbic system, for example.
I think this condition is a good condition to impose if you are keen to ensure
that functionalist hypotheses say something substantially different from hypothe-
ses about input–output dispositions. But, of course, it’s a bad condition to impose
if you really don’t care about what’s going on at the hardware level, and so you
don’t want to commit to any hypotheses about what is going on at the hardware
level, especially not any risky hypotheses. And not caring about what’s going on
at the hardware level is one of the key motivations for functionalism in the first
place. So functionalists face a bit of a dilemma here, I think.
A third plausible necessary condition is that a variable is genuine only if the
putative variable enters into some systematic counterfactual dependency relation-
ships. But note that this necessary condition is automatically fulfilled, if proposi-
tion i for example is fulfilled. So this is not much of a constraint at all in this
setting.
A fourth plausible necessary condition says that idea of a variable being a gen-
uine variable is a primitive notion that resists an easy definition. Such conditions
are respectable within philosophy, but I suspect that most economists will not want
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to appeal to anything so metaphysical or mysterious.
In sum, I’ve argued that it’s not clear what cognitive variables count as gen-
uine variables. This motivates the third question in my framework: (III) does one
intend to impose heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine hardware /
cognitive variable? Howone answers this question determines—surprisingly—how
much of a gulf there is between behavioural scientists who aim to test functional-
ist hypotheses versus behavioural scientists who aim to test hypotheses about in-
put–output dispositions. And this, in part, determines how much of a gulf there is
between functionalist varieties ofmentalism (on the one hand) and the behavioural
tradition (on the other). This presents functionalists with a dilemma: insofar as
one places heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine cognitive vari-
able, functionalist hypotheses make some risky claims about what’s going on at
the hardware level, something that functionalists want to avoid doing; but insofar
as one doesn’t place any heavy duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine cogni-
tive variable, the functionalist position collapses to input–output dispositionalism,
something more agreeable to the behavioural tradition from which functionalists
want to distance themselves.
6 Does Economics Care about Plasticity of Choice Dispositions?
A third way of interpreting the question “should economics study the psycholog-
ical basis of agents’ choice behaviour?”, I will now suggest, is to interpret it as the
question “should economics study whether agents’ choice dispositions are plas-
tic?”. It follows, as a corollary, that a helpful precursor to answering this question
is to first ask question IV from my proposed framework: does economics ulti-
mately aim to know whether agents’ choice dispositions are plastic? In answering
this question, I will raise a second problem for functionalist varieties of mentalism.
To understand this question, consider again the strongly conservative func-
tionalist hypothesis HSC from Section 4. That is to say, a modification of the hy-
pothesis HF by dropping all causal role requirements other than the means–end
agency role. As I noted, HSC does not predict what Eve’s menus-to-choice map-
ping would have been, for example, if instead Eve had been socialised with people
who listen to Beyonce (answer: Mapping Two).
Nevertheless,HSC entails that it is possible for Eve’s menus-to-choice mapping
to have been different. In particular, there is some unspecified way of interven-
ing on Eve that would have resulted in menus-to-choices Mapping Two, namely
an unspecified intervention on variables Ua Ub that sets Ub > Ua.11 This follows
from the in-principle intervenability condition from Section 5 on a variable be-
11This does specify Ub > Ua but says nothing about what that would involve in hardware terms.
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ing a genuine variable. But, unlike functionalist hypothesis HF , functionalist hy-
pothesis HSC doesn’t entail anything specific about this intervention. It doesn’t
say of any specific socialisation and informational scenario, that in that scenario
Ub > Ua would be the case. ButHSC does entail that there exists some unspecified
in-principle intervention on Eve that would bring out Ub > Ua, and would thereby
bring about Mapping Two. (The same point goes for Mapping Three: HSC en-
tails that there exists some unspecified in-principle intervention on Eve that would
bring out P > :5. and would thereby bring about Mapping Three. In contrast,
HF specifies what that intervention is: tell Eve that seventy percent of the cards in
the deck are diamonds, for example.)
When one describes the menus-to-choices mappings that Eve could in princi-
ple have had (Mapping Two and Mapping Three for instance)—without saying
anything about what specific interventions would bring about what mappings—I
will say that one has given a non-specific description of the plasticity of Eve’s
menus-to-choice mapping. In this respect, even the strongly conservative HSC
describes non-specifically the plasticity of Eve’s menus-to-choice mapping. (This
distinguishes strong conservatism from extreme conservatism, which says that eco-
nomics does not ultimately care about the relationship between any cognitive vari-
ables, not even the means-ends agency causal role. Economics does not ultimately
care about any functionalist hypotheses.)
This peculiar feature of functionalist hypotheses has (to my knowledge) not be-
fore been pointed out. To see just how peculiar this feature is, consider the model
of the consumer, interpreted as any form of functionalist hypothesis. According
to this functionalist hypothesis, the consumer’s choices over commodity bundles
is plastic, I’ve just shown. The hypothesis says that the consumer’s choice dispo-
sitions can be made to conform to any rank ordering one likes. There is a way
of intervening on the consumer, for example, so that her choices conform to the
weird rank ordering: 100 apples > 2 apples > 3 apples > 0 apples > 1 apple > 99
apples. Or, applying the model of the consumer to a voting context, there is a way
of intervening on a voter so that her choices conform to the weird rank ordering:
Centrist > Neo-Nazi > Free-market liberal > Stalinist > Green > Social demo-
crat. I myself find it somewhat implausible that any consumer’s or voter’s choices
are that plastic (malleable). So any functionalist interpretation of the model of the
consumer interprets this model as making some very claims, I suggest, about the
plasticity of consumer’s choice dispositions.
Corollary. This illustrates the fourth question in my proposed framework: does
economics ultimately care about knowing non-specifically the plasticity of Eve’s
choices? For example, imagine that you believe a functionalist hypothesis about
how voters are socialised into having utilities over political ideologies, and how
they use information to form beliefs about which candidates represent which po-
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litical ideologies. But suppose that you then discover the following. Yes, your
hypothesis is exactly right about who a voter would vote for if she were to receive
different information, or if she had been socialised differently. In this respect,
your model correctly describes the plasticity of her vote with respect to these two
specific external factors. But, no, your hypothesis is wrong in another respect:
since your hypothesis is a functionalist hypothesis, it has the peculiar and risky im-
plication that there is, in principle, some unspecified intervention on this voter’s
hardware states that would set u(Centrist) > u(Neo-Nazi) > u(Free-market liberal)
> u(Stalinist) > u(Green) > u(Social democrat); and this implication is false, you
discover. In this respect, your model incorrectly describes the non-specific plas-
ticity of her vote. Does economics care about this discovery as an end in itself ?
Does this discovery about this voter speak to one of the questions about the voter
that economics was ultimately aiming to answer? It is clear that Gul & Pesendor-
fer (2008) would answer no, as would Clarke (2016) and Thoma (2020). Dietrich
& List (2016) say that economics ultimately aims to test functionalist hypotheses,
and so they are implicitly committed to defending a yes answer. What about other
mentalists, such as Hausman (2012)? On the one hand, most philosophers agree
that functionalism is the most plausible philosophy of mind, and so Hausman and
others have strong reason to answer yes. But, on the other hand, functionalism
when applied to economic models has the risky implication that I’ve just pointed
out. So Hausman and others also have strong reason to answer no. Another
dilemma.
Why is it a good thing to answer question IV ? It’s a good thing, because how
you answer this fourth question determines what evidence is relevant for eco-
nomics. Take for example Glimcher’s experiments that purport to show that, for
each option in a choice experiment, there are a highly-localised bunch of neurons
that is causally responsible for the agent’s inclination to choose that option over
other options (Glimcher et al., 2005). Glimcher’s neural observations are some
evidence that it is possible to intervene on economic agents such that they exhibit
a very different pattern of choice behaviour: just find some way of intervening
on these neurons. So Glimcher’s neural observations provide some evidence that
agents’ choice dispositions are very plastic. Therefore, Glimcher’s neural obser-
vations provide some evidence for any functionalist hypothesis, since all function-
alist hypotheses are committed to Eve’s choice dispositions being very plastic. So,
if the answer to question IV is yes, then Glimcher’s observations are relevant to
economics.
I conclude that a third way of interpreting the question “should economics
study the psychological basis of agents’ choice behaviour?” is to interpret it as the
question “should economics study non-specifically the plasticity of agents’ menu-
to-choice mapping?”. It followed, as a corollary, that a helpful precursor to an-
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swering this question is to first ask question IV frommy proposed framework: does
economics ultimately care about knowing non-specifically the plasticity of these
mappings?
7 Does Economics Care about Intentional Choice?
In this section, I will point out that the notion of choice behaviour is also ambigu-
ous. On the one hand there is intentional choice, and on the other hand there is
what I will call eliminativist choice. It follows, as a corollary, that a helpful pre-
cursor to answering the psychology-in-economics question—about whether eco-
nomics should study the psychological basis of choice behaviour—is to first ask
question V from my proposed framework: does economics ultimately aim to pre-
dict and explain an agent’s choices qua intentional choices? Since this point has
already been made briefly by Clarke (2016) and more carefully and thoroughly
by Thoma (2020), my treatment here will be quick.
Recall the model from Section 2, which refers, amongst other things, to the
event of Eve choosing to hear Aerosmith guaranteed. Note that there are two
ways of theorising events such as this one. One theory says that this event is the
event of Eve’s body moving in such a way that she actually did hear Aerosmith.
An alternative theory says that this event is the event of Eve intentionally acting in
such a way that Eve knewwould cause her to hear Aerosmith. To see the difference
between these two theories of choice events, imagine that Eve walks into a cafe and
inadvertently ends up hearing Beyonce; but, if she had walked into a second cafe,
she would have instead inadvertently heard Aerosmith. On the former theory,
Eve has chosen to hear Beyonce over Aerosmith. But on the latter theory, she
has not. I will call the former theory the “eliminativist” theory of choice events,
because it eliminates the vocabulary of commonsense psychology from our theory
of choice events. Choice events are not theorised in terms of an agent’s intentional
actions or an agent’s knowledge. Instead, the theory says that for an agent A to
choose an option O1 over an option O2 is just for A’s body to move in such a way
as O1 occurs rather than O2.
In contrast, I will call the alternative theory the “ordinary intentional” theory
of choice events, because it’s the understanding we typically adopt in everyday
and philosophical discussions. Choice events are theorised in terms of an agent’s
intentional actions or knowledge or similar. To be specific, the ordinary inten-
tional theory says that for an agent A to choose an option O1 over an option O2 is
just for the following to hold: (i) A forms an intention to move her body in way X ;
and (ii) A knows that moving her body in way X will result in O1 occurring rather
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than O2 occurring.12 For more on the distinction between intentional action and
mere bodily movement see Wilson & Shpall (2016); see also Thoma (2020) for a
discussion in the context of economic models of choice behaviour.
Next, note that Mapping One is at least part of the content of the model from
Section 1, everyone agrees:13
If Eve’s menu were any possible subset of the four options I II A B, then Eve
would choose the highest option on the ordering A > I > II > B.
It follows that, on the eliminativist theory of choice behaviour, the model has
the following as part of its content: Eve’s body never moves in a way that results
in her hearing Beyonce, when Eve’s body could have moved in a way that results
in her hearing Aerosmith. As Hausman (2012) points out, this claim is very rarely
true of an agent: sometimes Eve is ignorant of the effects of her actions and so
Eve’s body does indeed move in a way that results in her hearing Beyonce. Eve
inadvertently wanders into a cafe in which Beyonce is playing, for example. So on
the eliminativist theory of choice behaviour the content of most economic models
of choice behaviour is false. I call this Hausman’s Objection from Ignorance.
Note, however, that this problem does not arise if one theorises choice be-
haviour in the ordinary intentional way. On the ordinary intentional theory of
choice behaviour, the model has the following as part of its content: Eve never
intentionally acts in such a way that she knows will result in her hearing Beyonce,
when she could intentionally act in a way that she knows will result in her hearing
Aerosmith. This is a plausible claim to make of Eve. So Hausman’s Objection
from Ignorance does not arise for models on a ordinary intentional interpreta-
tion of choice, even though it does for models on an eliminativist interpretation
of choice.
(This distinction between the ordinary intentional theory and eliminativist the-
ory generalises: one might make exactly the same point about the external factors
to which the hypothesisHF refers: Eve being socialised with people who like Aero-
smith, Nina telling Eve that n out of them cards are diamonds, and the like. One
can either read these conditions in the ordinary sense—as making claims about
Nina’s intentions for example. Or one can try to give them an eliminativist read-
ing.)
I conclude that the notion of choice behaviour is ambiguous between inten-
tional choice and eliminativist choice. It follows, as a corollary, that a help-
ful precursor to answering the question—about whether economic should study
12In fact, this is a highly simplified version of the theory, about which there is much philosophical
controversy (Wilson & Shpall, 2016).
13Some economists and philosophers would say that Mapping One exhausts the content of the
model, whereas others think that there is more to the content of the model than Mapping One
alone.
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the psychological basis of choice behaviour—is to first ask question V from my
proposed framework: does economics ultimately aim to predict and explain an
agent’s choices qua intentional choices?
8 Conclusion
I’ve argued that the controversy over the proper role of psychological concepts,
explanations and evidence in economics is multifaceted and profoundly indeter-
minate. Firstly, the notion of choice behaviour is ambiguous, in a way that blurs
the boundaries between the mentalist and behavioural traditions (Section 7). Sec-
ondly, the notion of a cognitive variable is ambiguous, in a way that threatens to
collapse psychological hypotheses about cognitive processes into hypotheses about
input–output dispositions, hypotheses more agreeable to the behavioural tradition
(Section 5). This supports Guala’s contention that “terms like mental and psycho-
logical, unfortunately, are often used differently by economists, psychologists and
philosophers, generating considerable confusion in this debate” (Guala, 2019, p.
387).
Thirdly, there are at least three parts to the mentalist behavioural controversy.
First there is the issue of whether economics should study the brain anatomy or
hardware that realises agents’ functional–dispositional states (Section 3). A sec-
ond part of this controversy is the question of whether economics should study the
causes and effects of cognitive variables (Section 4). A third part of this contro-
versy, I suggest, is whether economics should study non-specifically the plasticity
of agents’ choice dispositions (Section 6).
One benefit of clearing up these ambiguities in this controversy is that it throws
light on some problems for functionalist varieties of mentalism (Dietrich & List,
2016). Section 5 showed that functionalists face a dilemma: insofar as one places
heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine cognitive variable, function-
alist hypotheses make some risky claims about what’s going on at the hardware
level, something that functionalists don’t want to do; but insofar as one doesn’t
place any heavy duty restrictions on what counts as a genuine cognitive variable,
the functionalist position collapses to a form of dispositionalism, something more
agreeable to the behavioural tradition from which functionalists distance them-
selves. What’s more, Section 6 showed that, on even a very modest restriction on
what counts as a genuine cognitive variable, functionalist hypotheses make some
implausible commitments to the plasticity of agent’s options-to-choices mappings.
En route, I’ve argued that part of the controversy is about the ultimate aims of
economics as a discipline, and that it’s unhelpful to vaguely assert that economics
ultimately aims to predict and to explain choice behaviour (Section 2). Instead,
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I’ve suggested a framework of five useful questions:
(I) Does economics ultimately care about the brain anatomy or hardware that
realise any functional–dispositional states?
(II) Which external causes, which cognitive causes, and which cognitive ef-
fects of cognitive variables does economics ultimately care about identifying,
if any?
(III) Does one intend to impose heavy-duty restrictions on what counts as a
genuine cognitive variable?
(IV) Does economics ultimately care about knowing non-specifically the plas-
ticity of agents’ menus-to-choices mapping?
(V) Does economics ultimately aim to predict and explain an agent’s inten-
tional choices, as opposed to her choices in an eliminativist sense?
The five questions in my framework allow one to make it clear what one takes
economics to be ultimately aiming at. As such, my framework makes it clear
how one can develop various different positions that occupy a middle ground in
between the mentalist and behavioural traditions. For example, Clarke (2014,
2016), Thoma (2020) and Vredenburgh (2020), give a mentalist answer to ques-
tion V, but a behavioural answer to questions I and II. Therefore, I hope that
my framework will allow for a much clearer discussion of the controversy: what
sort of neurobiological (brain scanner), cognitive psychological (reaction time), or
phenomenological (self-report) evidence can be used to test and improve the sorts
of hypotheses that economics ultimately aims to test?
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